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Severing the Link between Farm Program 
Payments and Farm Production: 
Motivation, International Efforts, and 
Lessons
Clayton W. Ogg and G. Cornelis van Kooten
Decoupling Farm Payments: Experience in the 
United States, Canada and Europe
Historically, farm program provisions distorted agricul-
tural production and resource use, in turn affecting agri-
cultural prices, trading partner relationships, levels of
government support, and environmental quality. Recog-
nizing this, the United States moved to “decouple” pro-
gram payments from production in 1996, but it
subsequently stepped back from this position in 2002
when it reestablished program yields and base acreages in
certain payment formulas. 
Although the EU and Canada have less experience
with decoupling mechanisms, they are pursuing different
and potentially useful options. In this paper, we review
experience with decoupling in the United States, Canada
and Europe, attempting to glean something about options
for future farm policies. 
Why Might We Want to Decouple?
Price-support payments often provide incentives for farm-
ers to increase production, which typically involves
expanded use of chemicals and cropping on marginal
lands. Decoupling government payments from production
eliminates incentives to overproduce. Decoupling also
addresses depressed regional and global prices that are the
result of overproduction in the major grain-growing
regions of the world. This can be important both domesti-
cally and internationally. Domestically, reducing produc-
tion incentives tends to reduce supply, which raises
commodity prices and lessens the need for farm income
support.  Internationally, decoupling enhances compliance
with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules that encour-
age countries either to decouple—to sever the link
between income support for farmers and production—or
to reduce the level of support payments, with sanctions
recommended against those countries that fail to achieve
progress in this regard. Finally, decoupling initiatives
address the domestic environmental damage that results
when price-support programs encourage greater use of
pesticides and fertilizers (which are pollutants), while
decreasing the damage from increased conversion of mar-
ginal lands (including wetlands and other natural areas) to
cropland as well as effect other environmentally sensitive
practices (tillage intensity, irrigation, etc.).
Background
Initiatives to liberalize trade in Europe and North America
have included modifications of the formulas used in mak-
ing payments to farmers. In 1996, the United States
adjusted the yield and base acreage used in computing
farmers’ payments in ways that reduced their distorting
effects on input use, trade, and the environment. A yield
history and fixed-base acreage had already become a fea-
ture of Canadian and European Union (EU) agricultural
support payments in 1991 and 1992, respectively. But
when the EU undertook their decoupling initiative in
2003/04, some member states began to modify the base
acreage used in their payment formula (Kelch & Normile,
2004), in a manner reminiscent of the United States’ back-
tracking on decoupling in 2002. 
The similarities in approach make it relatively easy to
describe US, Canadian and EU decoupling options and48 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2004
compare their effectiveness, although
subtle differences can greatly influ-
ence their effectiveness. The stakes
are high because payments that
encourage farmers to produce more
will undermine world prices, pressure
the domestic environment, and
increase the cost of everyone’s farm
programs.
Recent Decoupling Initiatives in 
the United States, Canada, and 
the EU
We begin with the US experience,
because the United States was first to
attempt complete decoupling of the
links between payments and farm
production processes. Further, we
find that Canada and the EU pursue
options similar to those in the United
States, so they face similar challenges.
Decoupling in the United States. The
United States attempted to decouple
payment programs in 1996 by (a)
freezing the yield history used in
computing farmer payments (rather
than basing payments on recent
cropping history), (b) allowing plant-
ing flexibility (rather than requiring
farmers who choose to participate to
plant within their prior base acreage
for all crops), and (c) permitting
farmers to cease farming while still
receiving payments.
Although the first option was
implemented for nearly two decades
prior to 1996 without major contro-
versy, severing the link between farm-
ing and payments (the third option)
proved difficult to accomplish politi-
cally, because it went against most
people’s sense of fairness—producers
should be paid for producing some-
thing, not for sitting idly by. As a
consequence, the idea of decoupling
was looked upon by some with skep-
ticism. In 2002, the United States
allowed farmers to reestablish the
payment yields and/or base acreage
used in certain payment formulas.
Decoupling in Canada. Canada’s agricul-
tural programs, at least in the West,
are partly driven by the Canadian
Wheat Board (CWB) marketing
regime that bases quotas for eligible
grains on farmed area and thus
encourages farmers to cultivate as
much land as possible (Schmitz &
Furtan, 2000). In addition, the
“Crow” transportation subsidy and
feed freight assistance raised farm
gate prices, leading farmers to expand
cropland and farm more intensively.
It was not until 2000 that the effects
of the Crow subsidy and feed freight
assistance were eliminated. Mean-
while, there has been a move to
implement programs that enable
farmers to remain eligible for CWB
quota while converting some lands to
a long-term conservation use (such as
permanent pasture).
Canada replaced existing farm
programs in 1991 with the Net
Income Stabilization Account
(NISA), which is based on a five-year
average of recent net income, and the
Gross Revenue Insurance Program
(GRIP), which is based on a system
of base acreage and yield history,
much like the pre-1985 US
approach. NISA is decoupled from
the production decisions of farmers,
because it is paid on a lump-sum
basis, but GRIP bases payments on
individual farmer’s recent yields and
base acreage, excluding pasture and
forage crops, whereas other programs
provide producers with fuel rebates
and tax incentives. Such programs
encourage greater input use and pro-
duction to the detriment of the envi-
ronment (van Kooten & Folmer,
2004; Schmitz & Furtan, 2000).
Unlike the United States, Canada
relies on subsidies rather than conser-
vation compliance to counter adverse
effects of agricultural programs and
promote good environmental land
uses.
Decoupling in Europe. The framework
for price and support policy in the
EU, known as common market
organizations (CMOs), was devel-
oped over the period 1962–1969.
The 1992/93 MacSharry reforms
were the first attempt to decouple
agricultural payments from produc-
tion, although their primary purpose
was to reduce the overall level of sup-
port. The reforms sought to lower
EU prices toward the world price,
compensate farmers for the lower
prices via an income payment, and
impose land set asides on larger crop
producers. Agenda 2000 deepened
the MacSharry reforms and empha-
sized the environment and provision
of public goods. 
The decoupling initiatives in
these reform packages were not very
effective, as they were only imple-
mented on the largest farms (because
small farmers could not handle the
reporting requirements); many coun-
tries simply lacked the needed gover-
nance structures to implement the
reforms (Brümmer & Koester, 2004).
The June 2003 Luxembourg reform
attempts to address problems by
moving away from using a base acre-
age, relying instead on a payment
based on past payments (Kelch &
Normile, 2004). This avoids the
temptation for nations to reestablish
their acreage base, which shifts over
time in any event.
Effectiveness of Decoupling 
Options
What can we say about the effective-
ness of decoupling initiatives across
regions and approaches? In compar-
ing the effectiveness of decoupling
options, we consider options for (a)
determining yields in payment for-4th Quarter 2004 CHOICES 49
mulas, (b) providing planting flexi-
bility, and (c) allowing payments on
land no longer farmed.
Freezing Payment Yields. Hertel, Tsi-
gas, and Preckel (1990) projected
that continuing to keep payment
yields frozen under the 1990 U.S.
farm legislation would reduce US
variable input use (including chemi-
cal use) by 8%, while benefiting farm
incomes, reducing commodity pro-
gram outlays, and reducing distor-
tions in world prices. A key challenge
identified in the analysis (but not
addressed in the legislation) was the
need to update payment yields,
because farmers want payments to
increase with actual yields, which
tend to increase over time (although
differentially across the country).
They anticipated that if the Food,
Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade
Act of 1990 had indexed payment
yields in each state, the mounting
pressure to reestablish payment yields
on farms (which occurred in the
2002 Farm Bill) could be mitigated.
Addressing US payment yields by
freezing them and then applying an
index offers one of the least disrup-
tive decoupling options, because pay-
ments are still linked to farm-level
crop yields.
When the EU introduced their
version of a commodity payment sys-
tem for several major commodities,
they employed a regional  yield that
was not tied to yields on any individ-
ual farm, thus avoiding from the out-
set the above problems associated
with reestablishing payment yields.
(Canada previously used regional
yields in its crop insurance program,
although that program is now part of
GRIP, which does not use regional
yields.) Using regional yields in pay-
ment formulas results in a partial
decoupling of payments, as govern-
ment payments to farmers do not
encourage them to apply more chem-
icals per acre to increase their future
subsidy payments. (As noted above,
the United States attempted some-
thing similar through its freezing of
payment yields.)
The payment formulas discussed
in our analysis constitute a major, but
by no means the total, share of the
EU, US, and Canada’s potentially
trade-distorting farm programs.
Export subsidies and various other
protectionist devices also continue to
distort agricultural prices, produc-
tion, and trade. However, recent
moves toward a greater reliance on
payments (especially in the EU), as
opposed to export subsidies, enhance
the opportunities offered by our
three decoupling options. The need
for support payments of any kind are
lowered whenever countries reduce
output (by decoupling and/or reduc-
ing levels of support), thereby
encouraging higher global prices. 
Allowing Planting Flexibility. In the US,
environmental concerns that com-
modity programs allegedly encour-
aged monoculture of grain crops
provided one rationale for the early
emphasis on planting flexibility. His-
torically, soybeans were not a pro-
gram crop, but were needed for their
environmental benefits in a crop
rotation with corn. In practice, how-
ever, granting farmers planting flexi-
bility proved much less
environmentally beneficial than
hypothesized. According to Babcock
et al. (1997), the US experiment with
planting flexibility in the 1996 Farm
Bill did lead to significant crop acre-
age shifts; these shifts included a
23% increase in soybean acreage,
which provided additional opportu-
nities for crop rotation with Mid-
western corn, as expected. However,
they found that soybeans also
replaced 3 million acres of wheat in
Kansas and 800,000 acres of CRP
land. Thus, one can conclude that
the net effect of increased planting
flexibility in the 1996 Farm Bill was
only a modest gain for the environ-
ment (Babcock et al., 1997).
The MacSharry reform in Europe
allowed considerable planting flexi-
bility from the beginning, so the
EU’s payment system had some mar-
ket-oriented features since the early
1990s. Planting flexibility increases
efficiency because it allows farmers to
plant the most profitable crops,
thereby reducing the financial bur-
den of agricultural support programs,
but environmental benefits are less
clear. 
Allowing Commodity Payments on Land
No Longer Farmed. Permitting farmers
to exit agriculture and still receive
government payments offers an
important policy option, particularly
in North America where agriculture
is much more extensive (especially in
the Northern Plains). Commodity
payments have shifted the extensive
margin of cultivation and increased
output on marginal lands. In spite of
earlier efforts to change this, the
United States allowed farmers in
2002 to reestablish the base acreage
used in certain payment formulas.
The problem in the EU is that
member countries have flexibility to
design their own country-specific
approaches to decoupling; this may
lead to payments on land that is no
longer farmed in some countries, but
not all. For example, individual
countries may offer coupled pay-
ments that are allowed on up to 25%
of the area for arable crops (Kelch &
Normile, 2004). Some countries
apparently favor further development
of payment systems tied to an acreage
base, following the US approach. 
Unlike the United States, Cana-
dian programs are weaker in address-50 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2004
ing environmental concerns: They
contain no Sodbuster or Swamp-
buster provisions, for example, so
they have been implicated in a major
loss of prairie wetlands and in the
resulting decline of ducks, shore-
birds, and other migratory bird spe-
cies (van Kooten, 1993). As noted
above, Canada has taken steps toward
decoupling, but payments to farmers
under GRIP and some other pro-
grams (usually “emergency” pay-
ments when prices are considered too
low) are still based on area “under
cultivation,” as is the case under the
Wheat Board marketing system,
which is similar to the approach used
in the United States for decades.
Other Remedies
There are other ways to address pro-
grams’ tendencies to increase the
acreage cropped that are relevant to
the decoupling topic. The Conserva-
tion Reserve Program idles over a
tenth of US cropland and is joined
by Sodbuster and Swampbuster pro-
grams, all of which address the ten-
dency for price supports to expand
production onto marginal crop-
land—to shift the extensive margin
of agriculture and encroach upon
nature. The EU recently introduced a
10% set-aside on larger farms, which
is similar to the proportion of crop-
land idled by the CRP in the United
States (but not targeted to achieve
environmental benefits), and the EU
introduced a reserve for tree planting
to combat greenhouse gases. Canada
is also set to provide payments to
farmers to plant trees to earn offset
credits under Kyoto, although it is
discovering that this may be more
expensive than originally anticipated.
These green payment mecha-
nisms may appease trading partners
as they compensate, to some degree,
for the program-induced increases in
area cropped. However, they do so at
a cost. If programs initially were
designed in a way that avoids encour-
aging farmers to put more land into
crop uses, costs of cropland idling
programs could be reduced or
avoided.
So What Have We Found?
Although the United States achieved
an early start in decoupling payment
mechanisms, the United States
stepped back from fully decoupling
payments in 2002. It is our view that
policy revisions are needed to allow a
recommitment to decoupling and
reap its benefits. Namely, we feel
there is a need to (a) establish a for-
mula for payment yields that
advances with time but is not farm
specific, and (b) allow farmers to
receive payments even if they cease
growing a crop.
Although the EU and Canada
have less experience with decoupling,
they pursue some relatively effective
decoupling options. Canada’s NISA
program is a step in that direction.
The EU may still fail to achieve fully
its goals related to decoupling
because they allow member states
considerable flexibility, and some of
them are already moving toward a
system of base acreage, which pre-
sumably would need to be reestab-
lished in the future, as acreage shifts
over time.
We conclude that the EU and
North America have reached a criti-
cal juncture, as they have the oppor-
tunity to pursue relatively painless
decoupling-based remedies to costly
trade distortions and environmental
problems caused by domestic agricul-
tural policies.
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